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Abstract 
Construction remains a significant area of public expenditure. An understanding of the process 
of changes in construction pricing, and how the process can be manipulated through the release 
of bidding feedback information is vital, in order to best design clients’ procurement policies. 
This paper aims to statistically model inexperienced individual bidders’ learning in recurrent 
bidding under partial and full information feedback conditions. Using an experimental dataset, 
the developed linear mixed model contains three predictor variables, namely: time factor, 
information feedback conditions, and bidding success rate in the preceding round. The results 
show nonlinearity and curvature in the bidders’ learning curves. They are generally less 
competitive in time periods after a winning bid with lower average bids submitted by those 
subjected to full information feedback condition. In addition, the model has captured the 
existence of heterogeneity across bidders with individual-specific parameter estimates that 
demonstrate the uniqueness of individual bidders’ learning curves in recurrent bidding. The 
findings advocate for adequate bidding feedback information in clients’ procurement design to 
facilitate learning among contractors, which may in turn lead to increased competitiveness in 
their bids. 
Keywords: Construction procurement, bidding, information feedback, learning. 
Paper type: Research article 
Introduction 
Construction spending by public and private clients tends to be large scale and consequently 
expensive. An understanding of the process of changes in the price of building work, and how 
the process can be manipulated through the release of bidding feedback information is vital, in 
order to best design clients’ procurement policies, thereby optimising future procurement 
strategies. Information feedback in recurrent bidding is an important design variable in optimal 
procurement design, since it can substantially affect outcomes, even when the feedback has no 
strategic information value (Ockenfels and Selten, 2005). Milgrom and Weber (1982) pointed out 
that feedback information never has a negative value to the decision-maker. At worst, irrelevant 
bidding feedback information can be ignored by contractors.  
There is strong empirical evidence of systematic variations in bids over time (e.g., McCaffer and 
Pettitt, 1976; de Neufville, Lesage and Hani, 1977; Fu, Drew and Lo, 2002; Oo, Lo and Lim, 
2012), suggesting that contractors learn from their experiences. In examining a bidding dataset of 
public sector projects covering six years, Fu, Drew and Lo (2002) found that experienced 
contractors who bid more frequently are more competitive than contractors who bid only 
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occasionally. Cason and Friedman (1999) state that variations in bids are a result of a learning 
and adjustment process (i.e. adaptive learning) in order to reach an optimum price. Contractors 
tend to optimize their bids in recurrent bidding with positive reviews of previous bidding results 
(Fu, Drew and Lo, 2002). Similarly, Kagel and Levin (2002) suggest that bidders learn from their 
experiences, and that making profits, losses or being unsuccessful will result in changes to their 
bid prices. Thus, bidding feedback information plays a vital role to enable learning among 
contractors in recurrent bidding.  
This paper aims to statistically model inexperienced individual bidders’ learning in recurrent 
bidding under two different information feedback conditions, namely partial information 
feedback condition (winning bid and the identity of the winning bidder)  and full information 
feedback condition (all bids and the identity of the bidder making each bid).  The specific 
objectives are to: investigate whether inexperienced bidders become more competitive over time 
through recurrent bidding; study whether inexperienced bidders reach a steady-state as they learn 
through recurrent bidding; examine the role of information feedback on inexperienced bidders’ 
learning; and explore the learning trends of inexperienced bidders in recurrent bidding. Using a 
linear mixed model, the notion of heterogeneity is considered in the statistical modelling attempt 
to capture the existence of heterogeneity across individual bidders, demonstrating the uniqueness 
of individual bidders’ learning in recurrent bidding. It is noted that hitherto, no similar attempt 
has been made to derive empirically individual-specific parameter estimates that ascertain specific 
types of learning curves of individual bidders in response to different information feedback 
conditions. The purpose of undertaking this study is to advance our understanding of the 
process of changes in the construction pricing, and how the process can be manipulated through 
the release of bidding feedback information. The findings clearly have implications on clients’ 
procurement policies. 
Information Feedback and Learning in Construction Bidding 
There is a collection of studies in conventional economics that examined the effect of different 
bidding information feedback conditions on bidders’ bidding behavior via experimental settings. 
These experiments were designed in two main settings, namely ascending first-price sealed-bid 
auction (e.g. Neugebauer and Selten, 2006; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008; Neugebauer 
and Perote, 2008) and descending first-price sealed-bid auction (e.g. Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 
2002; Esponda, 2008). They provide a substantial amount of evidence that varying information 
feedback conditions affect bidders’ competitiveness to different degrees, thereby affecting the 
revenues of those accepting bids to buy or sell. 
In construction bidding, many codes of bidding procedure recommend clients provide 
contractors with bidding feedback information (e.g. Ministry of Finance, 2005; New South Wales 
Government, 2005). The information feedback conditions adopted by construction clients can 
be broadly classified into full, partial and no information (Oo, Abdul-Aziz and Lim, 2011). In the 
full information feedback condition, bidders were informed at the end of each bidding 
competition about all bids and the identity of the bidder making each bid. In the partial 
information feedback condition, bidders were provided only with the winning bid and the 
identity of the winning bidder at the end of each bidding competition. However, in many cases, 
clients do not provide feedback information or provide insufficient feedback to contractors 
(Drew and Fellows, 1996). Despite the fact that the exercise to collect historical bids is both time 
consuming and expensive to undertake (Lowe and Skitmore, 2006) it has been reported that 
contractors obtained historic bidding data from a variety of sources, including: competitors, 
subcontractors, friendly acquaintances, suppliers and newspapers (Park and Chapin, 1992; Drew 
and Fellows, 1996). This can be explained because contractors have to rely on effective pricing 
methods in order to translate potential business into reality for long-term survival of their firms, 
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this inevitably involves effective utilization of bidding feedback information towards winning 
jobs with high profit potential (Soo and Oo, 2010). They use historic bidding dataset for their 
own purpose wherever it seems fit, including (Drew and Fellows, 1996; Lo, Drew and Fu, 2000; 
Runeson, 2000): (i) for analyzing the prevailing market conditions; (ii) for analyzing the 
competitiveness of their cost estimates; (iii) for deciding on whether or not to bid for future 
projects; (iv) for determining mark-up for future projects; (v) for analyzing their bidding 
performance; and (vi) for analyzing bidding performance of their competitors. Kortanek, Sodeni 
and Sodaro (1973) noted that a bidder’s bidding strategy that reflects its bidding behavior at any 
time is a direct product of learning, governing the bidder’s competitiveness. Fu, Drew and Lo 
(2004) proposed a conceptual framework of learning in recurrent construction bidding in which 
a contracting firm is seen as an interpretation system. The learning process activates the 
interpretation process that transforms a flow of data (i.e., previous bidding results and data 
derived from completed and ongoing projects) into information, and that interpreted 
information is incorporated into next bidding decision to enhance competitiveness. It is 
recognized that current and past project information would have an impact on contractors’ 
bidding decisions, the focus of this study is, however, on the effect of previous bidding results 
on inexperienced bidders’ learning. 
The Notion of Heterogeneity 
The bidder homogeneity assumption, i.e., all bidders are homogenous and behaving collectively 
and consistently in a similar statistical manner (Skitmore, 1991) has been adopted in considerable 
large sets of statistical bidding models, which can be attributed to data limitations that do not 
allow the application of heterogeneity approach to modelling (Runeson and Skitmore, 1999). 
However, of the little empirical research to date aimed at testing the tenability of this assumption, 
several studies have reported the existence of heterogeneity across bidders (e.g. Skitmore, 1991; 
Oo, Drew and Lo, 2007; 2008; 2010a). In modelling the extent to which individual bidders’ 
decision to bid and mark-up decisions are affected by a given set of project decision making 
environment factors, Oo, Drew and Lo’s (2007; 2008; 2010a) statistical models comprise 
individual-specific parameter estimates for each individual bidders in the samples involved. It 
follows that the heterogeneity puts contractors at varying predispositions for bidding decisions 
with bidding strategies varying from contractor to contractor in achieving individual firms’ 
pricing objectives (Oo, Drew and Lo, 2010a). Contractors have placed different degrees of 
preference and sensitivity toward factors affecting their bidding decisions as reported in many 
survey studies (e.g. Shash, 1993; Ling, 2005; Egemen and Mohamed, 2007). As an illustration of 
the notion of heterogeneity, Oo, Drew and Lo (2010a) used an example of bidding competition 
for a school project. Some contractors will have lower cost estimates and bid consistently low for 
a school project, if for no other reason than because of differentiable resources and capabilities, 
mainly through the learning curve in performing this type of project regularly. This may explain 
in part the variations in contractors’ bids and so the bidding performance differs among 
contractors. The present work adopts a heterogeneity approach to modelling specific types of 
learning curves of individual bidders in response to different information feedback conditions. 
Knowledge Gap 
Recently, experimental studies that specifically focus of the effect of bidding feedback 
information on inexperienced bidders’ bidding behavior were reported (Soo and Oo, 2010; Oo, 
Abdul-Aziz and Lim, 2011; Oo, Ling and Soo, 2014). Their findings provide a strong indication 
of continuous learning among the bidders. Oo, Abdul-Aziz and Lim (2011) have also examined 
the extent to which the bidders’ bidding trends agree with the behavioral patterns proposed by 
learning direction theory postulated by Selten and Stoecker (1986) and Selten and Buchta (1999). 
Construction Economics and Building, 15(4), 16-29  
 
Oo, Ling and Soo 19 
 
In relation to capacity utilization, they found that bidders with partial bidding feedback 
information are more likely to vary their bids as indicated by the theory over a time period 
consisting ten bidding rounds. Fu, Drew and Lo (2004) proposed a hypothetical learning curve 
in recurrent bidding, which consists of start-up and steady-state learning phases. In a start-up 
learning phase, bidders are expected to learn rapidly as demonstrated by increased bidding 
competitiveness in initial bidding attempts. For a steady learning phase, the learning curve is in a 
plateau pattern, indicating that bidders have obtained their optimal bidding strategy. However, 
their results only partially support the existence of rapid learning during the start-up phase 
among the inexperienced bidders (newly listed contractors), while experienced bidders in their 
sample were in a steady phase of learning demonstrated by their behavioral regularity. It is noted 
that their analysis was based on graphical plots, with no attempt to quantify the effect of time 
factor on bidders’ learning over time. Similarly, Skitmore and Runeson (2006) focused on 
variations in bids over time in testing the stationarity assumption of bidding models, but not on 
the quantification of effect of time on contractors’ bid prices. This study was undertaken to fill 
this knowledge gap by presenting a statistical model on individual bidders’ learning over time in 
recurrent bidding in response to the two information feedback conditions – partial and full. 
Research Hypothesis 
The hypotheses that formed the foundation for this empirical investigation are set out below:  
H1: Inexperienced bidders become more competitive over time through learning in 
recurrent bidding.  
H2: The learning curve of inexperienced bidders in recurrent bidding consists of start-up 
and steady-state learning phases.   
H3: The partial and full information feedback conditions have an impact on inexperienced 
bidders’ learning in recurrent bidding.  
H4: There is significant heterogeneity across inexperienced individual bidders’ learning in 
recurrent bidding. 
Research Method 
A large study on the effect of different information feedback conditions on inexperienced 
bidders’ competitiveness in recurrent bidding has been conducted. An experimental research 
design was used because there are many possible factors affecting contractors’ bidding decisions, 
and only an experimental research design would allow for control over the variables, something 
that would not have been possible using field data. Moreover, it would have been difficult to 
obtain the necessary data for projects of different sizes and types along with different 
information feedback conditions. Oo, Ling and Soo (2014) reported on the bidders’ bidding 
behavior in terms of bid competitiveness, bid-spread, and the effect of cost estimate accuracy 
under full and partial information feedback conditions. This study reports on the bidders’ 
learning in recurrent bidding in response to the two information feedback conditions. 
Dataset 
The dataset from Oo, Ling and Soo (2014) was used for the modelling attempt in the present 
work. It is a panel dataset consisting of 1349 bids obtained through a controlled research 
situation via an experimental design that used information feedback as the experiment treatments 
(P = partial information feedback; F = full information feedback). The inexperienced (student) 
subjects in their experiment were randomly assigned to one of two treatments with 10 bidding 
rounds (two rounds per week) per treatment. Each of the two primary groups (P and F) were 
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further split into 12 subgroups (five students in each subgroup) to simulate a bidding 
competition of 12 competing bidders (N = 12). In each bidding round, the subjects were invited 
to bid for six hypothetical general building projects (a total of 60 hypothetical projects 
comprising schools and institutional buildings). Apart from the project information (location, 
duration, client and contract type), the subjects were also given an unbiased cost estimate for 
each hypothetical project, which is the net project construction cost (i.e., total of direct cost 
estimate + site overheads).  They were required to decide which project to bid for, and submit 
their bids to the experiment coordinator via emails. The general instruction to the subjects was 
that their ultimate aim was to survive and make the most profit in a competition where the 
lowest bidder wins the job. It is worth noting that identical hypothetical projects and unbiased 
cost estimates were used for both P and F treatments to enable direct comparisons between the 
two groups. 
The suitability of the dataset is supported by three reasons that allow us to test the research 
hypotheses as unambiguously as possible. First, the use of inexperienced student subjects in the 
experiment enables the examination of true learning behavior of bidders. Dyer, Kagel and Levin 
(1989) pointed out that the examination is only possible with inexperienced bidders because 
experienced bidders “carry” industry experience and known rule-of-thumbs to a simulated 
experiment, causing data contamination. Second, Oo, Ling and Soo (2014) conducted the 
experiment in an environment in which experiences (learning) could be gained and bankruptcy 
could occur. Each subject in their experiment was ‘given’ a start-up capital of S$ 400,000 (S$1 ≈ 
US$0.80) to sustain the operating expenses (capital charges, general overheads, etc.) estimated at 
S$ 40,000 per bidding round, and profit or loss was generated for each hypothetical project they 
won. The profit or loss was determined by deducting a randomly assigned final cost (ranging 
from 90% to 110% of unbiased cost estimate) from the winning bid. In this way, subjects that 
accrued losses that exhausted their start-up capital and accumulated profits would be declared 
bankrupt and no longer allowed to bid. Similarly, failure to win job to pay for operating expenses 
would eventually force the subjects out of the ‘market’- a reality in the construction industry. 
Also, the subjects were given limited working capacity and would have to incur a cost penalty 
(for the added costs of securing additional resources) if they had to operate beyond their optimal 
capacity (maximum five projects on hand at a time). After each round, subjects in both 
treatments were informed privately of their capacity utilization and the profit or loss generated 
from the projects they won in previous rounds. 
Lastly, the dataset was subjected to the statistical tests in Oo, Ling and Soo (2014) on seriousness 
of the student subjects’ bids and randomness of subject selection in the experimental setting. 
Their test results provided strong evidence that the quality of the experimental data was not 
being jeopardized by the use of student subjects.    
Development of the linear mixed model 
Linear mixed model (LMM), an extension of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis, 
was used to model the individual bidders’ learning in recurrent bidding. Similar to OLS 
regression analysis, the model assumes a continuous dependent variable is linearly related to a set 
of independent variables, but requires extra work in model specification and subsequent 
goodness-of-fit check (see Verbeke and Molenberghs (2000) for the model building process). 
The underlying premise of LMM is that some subset of the regression coefficients (the random 
effects) varies randomly from one individual (subject) to another, thereby accounting for 
heterogeneity in the population. It follows, therefore, there are essentially two components that 
make up a LMM, namely the fixed effects, β’s and the random effects, b’s. The fixed effects is the 
population mean profile that assumed to be shared by all individual bidders in the population, 
and the random effects that are subject-specific effects that are unique to individual bidders. The 
random effects are incorporated in the model to accommodate between-subject variability, in 
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which individuals in the population are assumed to have their own subject-specific mean profile. 
Oo, Drew and Lo (2010a) and Oo, Drew and Runeson (2010b) used the same modelling 
approach to examine individual bidders’ mark-up profiles in response to factors affecting their 
bidding decisions (i.e. with the parameter estimates that varied across individual bidders). Such 
estimates are of interest in the present analysis to examine subject-specific learning profiles in 
recurrent bidding. 
Learning, expressed in the form of subjects’ competitiveness, was taken as the dependent 
variable in the LMM. The unbiased cost estimate provides a common baseline and the measure 
of subjects’ competitiveness is to express each bid as a percentage above the unbiased cost 
estimate: 
MUP = 100 (xi – x) / x              (Eq. 1) 
Where: MUP is the mark-up percentage, xi is the ith subject’s bid and x is the unbiased cost 
estimate for each hypothetical project. Lower percentage values indicate greater competitiveness 
since the lowest bidder wins at the lowest bid price, and vice versa. 
There are four independent variables in the LMM. Time points (t), as indicated by the bidding 
round numbers (1 to 10), is a quantitative independent variable. A quadratic term for this 
variable (t2) is added to allow for nonlinear change in subject-specific learning curves. The 
information feedback group (G) is a categorical independent variable which requires the use of 
dummy variables, where G = 0 for group P and G = 1 for group F. Taking into account the 
experimental design in which the subjects were given feedback information about their 
performance in previous rounds, two additional independent variables have been considered in 
the modelling attempt to better reflect the subjects’ learning in recurrent bidding. They are: (i) 
current workload (W) that indicates the subjects’ capacity utilization, where W = 0 if they were 
working below optimal capacity (number of projects on hand ≤ 4) and W = 1 if they were 
working at or beyond optimal capacity (number of projects on hand ≥ 5) at a particular time 
point, and (ii) bidding success in preceding round (S). The latter is given by S = 0 if the subjects 
were unsuccessful and S = 1 if the subjects were successful in winning a job(s) in the preceding 
round. The decision to include these variables is supported by the empirical evidence discussed 
above (e.g. Fu, Drew and Lo, 2002; Kagel and Levin, 2002; Oo, Abdul-Aziz and Lim, 2011). It 
should be noted that the profit or loss on winning bids has not been included in the modelling 
attempt because this feedback information was not available from round to round and depend 
on the project duration. All the hypothetical projects have minimum project duration of two 
rounds in Oo, Ling and Soo’s (2014) experiment, and the profit or loss statement was not 
available until the completion of a project (i.e. a minimum lapse of two bidding rounds). 
To fix ideas, the LMM for modelling the MUP with intercepts and slopes that vary randomly 
across the ith subject at the jth measurement occasion (j = 1,…ni, ni is the number of bidding 
attempts per subject) has given rise to a linear prediction equation in the form of: 
 
ijiijiijiijiijiiij SbWbGbtbtbbMUP )()()()()()( 554433
2
221100 +++++++++++= bbbbbb   
                 (Eq. 2) 
Where: parameters β0,…, β5 are the population-average structure (i.e., the fixed effects that are 
shared for all bidders), whereas other parameters (i.e., b0i,…,b5i) are subject-specific effects (i.e., 
the random effects that are unique to each subject). In this LMM, fixed effects, β and random 
effects, b are connected to each other, so that any observable effect is a combination of the two. 
For example, (β1+b1i) is the ith subject’s slope, or rate of change in MUP (leaning) over time. It 
demonstrates the extension of the model to determine individual subjects’ characteristics 
(b0i,…,b5i) that relate to differences in MUP.   
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Results and Discussion 
The statistical inferences using t-, F-, Wald- and likelihood ratio-tests in the mixed effects model 
building process show that the best-fit LMM containing four predictor variables, namely: (i) time 
(t); (ii) time squared (t2); (iii) information feedback group (G); and (iv) bidding success rate in 
preceding round (S) as given below: 
ijiijijiijiiij SbGtbtbbMUP )()()()()( 553
2
221100 ++++++++= bbbbb      (Eq. 3) 
Comparing Eq. 2 and 3, it can be seen that current workload (W) was not found to be 
significant )( ib44 +b , and similarly for the random effect of information feedback group (b3i). 
The latter indicates that the variability between subjects is not significantly affected by their 
information feedback groupings. Table 1 contains the parameter estimates for the model fixed 
effects and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. Although the information feedback 
group (G) is not significantly different from zero at p < 0.05 (p = 0.06), the corresponding effect 
has not been removed from the best-fit LMM for two reasons. First, the null hypothesis that a 
simpler model without information feedback group (G) parameter is acceptable at p < 0.05 is 
rejected based on a likelihood ratio-test, indicating the best-fit model provides an adequate 
description of the dataset. Second, a point estimate for the average MUP level in the two 
information feedback groups may be of interest to reader. All the other fixed effects are 
significant at p < 0.05.  
 
Table 1: Parameter estimates for the fixed effects of the best-fit LMM 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t Sig. 
95% confidence interval 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Intercept, 0b  9.095 1.290 7.051 0.000 6.428 11.761 
Time, 1b  -1.370 0.464 -2.952 0.007 -2.333 -0.408 
Time x time, 2b  0.102 0.037 2.757 0.011 0.025 0.178 
Group, 3b  -0.788 0.419 -1.882 0.060 -1.663 0.087 
Success, 5b  1.347 0.501 2.691 0.014 0.303 2.391 
Table 2 contains the random effects estimation (or known as empirical ‘Best Linear Unbiased 
Predictor’ (BLUP)) for individual bidders. All the subjects were assigned each a code to preserve 
anonymity. For subjects in the partial information feedback group, the coding starts with letter P 
and followed by the numbering from one to twelve. On the other hand, letter F is used for 
subjects in the full information feedback group, i.e. F1 to F12 corresponding to the twelve 
subjects. It can be seen that the empirical BLUPs are of both positive and negative signs, 
indicating that the individual bidders’ responses to the predictor variables are either above or 
below the population mean. For example, the intercept for subject F1 of negative sign (b01 = -
5.951) indicates that the ‘true’ MUP of this subject is below of the population mean based on the 
model parameter (β0+b0i) in Eq. 3. The term ‘true’ MUP is used to remind reader that this b0i is a 
parameter in the LMM since the actual MUP when other parameters in the model are zero is not 
observed and not estimable. Similarly, subject F1’s responses (slopes) to the time (b11 = 2.728) 
and time squared (b21 = -0.211) are of opposite signs, which indicate the corresponding effects 
are either above or below the population mean (see illustrative plot of subject-specific predicted 
MUP profile of Subject F1 in Figure 2).   
We first examine the fixed effects estimates, the model for the population mean, averaged over 
the distribution of the subject-specific random effects, is given by: 
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It appears that all the predictor variables have the expected signs. The population mean MUP is 
associated with a decrease of 1.37% over each time point, i.e., the bidders become more 
competitive in recurrent bidding through learning. This MUP trend is, however, offset by a 
nonlinear change of 0.102% over each time point. It provides evidence of nonlinearity and 
curvature in the bidders’ learning curves. Figure 1 shows the predicted mean MUP profiles over 
ten time points using Eq. 4 according to bidding success in preceding round (S = 0 and S = 1). It 
can be clearly seen that the mean MUP profiles for subjects in both information feedback groups 
decrease over time before an increasing trend for the last few bidding rounds. Time point seven 
(t =7) is the turning point of the mean MUP profiles for subjects in both information feedback 
groups. This suggests that the subjects have submitted higher bids that might provide better 
payoffs – to maximize profits – after a start-up learning period. Another possible explanation for 
the increasing MUP trends after time point seven is that the subjects would have high current 
workload and thus bid higher since they were with less spare capacity. The evidence, however, 
suggests that changes in situational conditions of the bidders (e.g., current workload, resource 
capacity, financial standing) at the time of bidding, and that the bidders were in a continual 
process of learning. Therefore, hypothesis H1 that suggests inexperienced bidders become more 
competitive over time through learning in recurrent bidding is partially supported, given the 
existence of less competitive MUP trends after a period of time. H2 is also partially supported since 
there is an absence of steady-state learning phase in the mean MUP profiles for subjects in both 
information feedback groups. The less competitive bids after a start-up learning phase suggest 
that the bidders had yet to reach their optimal bidding strategy with a plateau pattern that 
characterizes a steady-state learning phase. This finding does not conform to the learning curve 
postulated in Fu, Drew and Lo (2004) which may be due to the short time frame of the 
experimental dataset of only ten time points, over 5 weeks.   
 
(a) Partial information feedback               (b) Full information feedback  
 
Figure 1: Population-average predicted profiles over time according to information feedback 
conditions and bidding success (S = 1 if successful: solid lines, and S = 0 if unsuccessful: short 
dashes) 
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Table 2: Empirical BLUPs for the random effects of the  best-fit LMM 
 Subject Empirical BLUPs for random effects 
ID Intercept, b0i  Time, b1i  Time x time, b2i  Success, b3i 
  Estimate Std. Error    Estimate Std. Error    Estimate Std. Error    Estimate Std. Error   
F1 -5.951 2.005 **  2.728 0.775 **  -0.211 0.066 **  0.790 1.205  F2 4.309 2.069 **  
-1.322 0.845 
  
0.086 0.071 
  
-1.359 0.968 
 F3 -3.976 1.873 **  
1.082 0.728 
  
-0.078 0.061 
  
-0.325 0.888 
 F4 -0.369 1.887 
 
 0.199 0.726 
 
 -0.029 0.061 
 
 0.021 1.592 
 F5 3.080 1.928 
 
 -0.506 0.753 
 
 0.017 0.064 
 
 -1.234 1.199 
 F6 1.004 1.884 
 
 
-1.288 0.745 
 
 
0.152 0.062 **  
1.831 0.982 
 F7 -2.111 1.949 
 
 
0.538 0.742 
 
 
-0.034 0.062 
 
 
-0.566 0.888 
 F8 -1.741 1.877 
  
0.323 0.729 
  
-0.025 0.061 
  
-0.888 0.843 
 F9 5.260 2.012 **  
-1.490 0.789 
 
 
0.097 0.066 
 
 
-2.371 1.095 ** 
F10 -9.974 1.988 
 
 
3.236 0.758 
 
 
-0.248 0.063 
 
 
4.621 1.104 
 F11 3.418 1.977 
 
 
-0.903 0.766 
 
 
0.084 0.064 
 
 
-0.874 1.136 
 F12 -2.087 1.880 
 
 
1.368 0.727 
 
 
-0.142 0.061 **  
-0.337 1.113 
 P1 10.423 2.104 
  
-3.788 0.823 
  
0.300 0.068 
  
-0.045 1.009 
 P2 -11.965 2.307 
  
3.774 0.864 
  
-0.273 0.071 **  3.572 1.214 ** 
P3 -1.239 1.913 
  
0.307 0.728 
  
-0.015 0.061 
  
-0.690 0.965 
 P4 5.681 1.880 **  
-1.301 0.728 
 
 
0.063 0.062 
 
 
-3.026 0.987 ** 
P5 -11.035 2.242 
 
 4.071 0.835 
 
 -0.310 0.069 
 
 2.996 0.932 ** 
P6 -4.092 2.017 **  
1.729 0.770 **  
-0.136 0.064 **  
-0.500 1.201 
 P7 5.984 2.049 ** 
 
-2.845 0.789 ** 
 
0.242 0.066 ** 
 
-0.515 0.917 
 P8 3.915 1.981 ** 
 
-1.347 0.779 
  
0.096 0.065 
  
-1.296 0.921 
 P9 -0.760 1.889 
  
-0.358 0.726 
  
0.041 0.061 
  
-0.567 0.873 
 P10 1.638 1.937 
  
-0.554 0.736 
  
0.032 0.062 
  
1.919 0.907 ** 
P11 3.233 1.922 
  
-0.492 0.758 
  
0.047 0.063 
  
-1.665 1.594 
 P12 7.355 1.888 **  -3.160 0.756   0.241 0.064 **  0.507 1.006  
** significant at p < 0.05 
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Next, the subjects in full information feedback group are generally more competitive that those 
in the partial information feedback group as demonstrated by a decrease of 0.788% in the 
predicted mean MUP for full information feedback group. The bidding feedback information 
plays a role in the bidders’ learning as demonstrated by higher bidding competitiveness for 
bidders in full information feedback group, similar to that of Soo and Oo (2010). This suggests 
that the considerably large amount of feedback information with 12 competing bidders in each 
bidding round of six hypothetical projects (i.e. a set of 72 bids and bidder identities) does not 
appear to retard the bidders’ learning. The subjects in full information feedback group had made 
use of the bidding feedback information and were able to bid competitively.  Thus, H3 that 
suggests the two information feedback conditions have an impact on inexperienced bidders’ 
learning in recurrent bidding is supported. Also, the subjects had bid higher with an increase of 
1.347% in the predicted mean MUP if they were successfully in winning a job(s) in the preceding 
round. It is noted that the positive effect of bidding success in the preceding round is similar to 
that of McCaffer and Pettitt (1976) and Oo, Lo and Lim (2012), where bidders are generally less 
competitive in time periods after a winning bid. 
To examine both the fixed and random effects estimates of the model, the empirical BLUPs for 
individual subjects (Table 2) were substituted into Eq. 3 to obtain the mean MUP profiles over 
time for each individual subjects. Figure 2 shows the illustrative plots of the predicted individual 
mean MUP profiles for Subjects P6 and P7 in partial information feedback group, and Subjects 
F1 and F9 in full information feedback group for scenario S =1 (i.e., won at least one job in 
preceding bidding round). The predicted population-average MUP profiles were imposed for 
illustrative purposes. These subjects were selected for the illustrative plots because the majority 
of their empirical BLUPs are significant at p < 0.05. It can be clearly seen that the direction of 
the mean MUP profiles for Subjects P7 and F9 have not deviated significantly from the 
respective population-average MUP profiles. However, their mean MUP profiles are steeper over 
time, particularly for Subject P7. This is mainly due to the larger adjustment in the subjects’ MUP 
over each time point as indicated by the higher empirical BLUPs for the slope for time factor 
(i.e., -2.845 for P7, -1.490 for F9). The mean MUP profiles for Subjects P6 and F1 are, however, 
of opposite trend compared to the respective population-average MUP profiles. That is, their 
mean MUP profiles increase over time and follow by a decreasing trend after a turning point. A 
possible explanation is that Subjects P6 and F1 were successfully in winning jobs in earlier 
bidding rounds (i.e., with high current workload) and submitted less competitive bids in 
subsequent rounds, and that they started to bid competitively for the last few bidding rounds 
when there was a need for more jobs. Overall, the empirical BLUPs and the illustrative plots 
clearly demonstrate the need to consider subject-specific effects in response to the predictor 
variables in examining individual bidders’ learning in recurrent bidding. There is significant 
heterogeneity across inexperienced individual bidders’ learning in recurrent bidding (which is 
reflected in the varying individual bidders’ intercepts and slopes). The learning curve of each 
individual bidder is unique. Hypothesis H4 is thus supported. The existence of heterogeneity 
across bidders in modelling their bidding behavior were also detected in Oo, Drew and Lo (2007; 
2008; 2010a), Oo, Drew and Runeson (2010b) and Oo, Lo and Lim (2012), suggesting that 
ignoring individual effects or heterogeneities that exist in the population could lead to 
inconsistent and meaningless estimates of interesting parameters (Hsiao, 2003). 
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Figure 2: Subject-specific predicted profiles over time (Subjects P6 and P7 in partial information 
feedback group, and Subjects F1 and F9 in full information feedback group for scenario S = 1, 
and the corresponding population-average predicted profiles are in thicker solid lines)  
 
The above empirical results demonstrate that learning occurs through recurrent bidding among 
the inexperienced bidders. The individual bidders’ learning trends are reflected in the variations 
of their bids over time in consideration of the feedback information conditions and their bidding 
success in the preceding round. Although there is insignificant variability between bidders in 
response to the feedback information conditions (i.e., the insignificant random effect of 
information feedback group, G), this predictor variable does affect all individual bidders in the 
samples involved as a whole. The insignificance can be partly explained by the fact that the 
partial or full information feedback condition was considered adequate by the individual bidders 
concerned, and did not cause significant variations in their responses since they all have access to 
winning bids in both information feedback conditions. There is evidence in the literature that the 
critical feedback information is the winning bids and bidders tend to base their bids on the 
winning bids (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008; Neugebauer and Perote, 2008). 
Nonetheless, the results show that the learning curve of each individual bidder is unique, and 
that bidders in the full information feedback group are generally more competitive than those in 
partial information feedback group.  
The best-fit LMM and the predicted individual bidders’ mean MUP profiles clearly have 
implications for both clients and contractors. For clients, they should consider providing 
adequate bidding feedback information in their procurement policy in order to obtain 
competitive bid prices. Here, there is evidence that full information feedback condition would 
lead to lower average bids. Also, clients may consider excluding bidders with high bidding 
success rate in their tenderer list in attempts to enhance efficiency of their procurement process, 
given that this group of bidders are likely to submit less competitive bids. The predicted 
individual bidders’ mean MUP profiles, on the other hand, provide an individual bidder 
concerned with an insight into its bidding competitiveness over time. In addition, the proposed 
P6 
P7 
F9 
F1 
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model has many potential uses in competitor analysis, as part of a more informed approach in 
identifying key competitors, and as a basis for formulating bidding strategies.  
Conclusions 
This paper presents a statistical model on inexperienced individual bidders’ learning in recurrent 
construction bidding under partial and full information feedback conditions. The predictor 
variables in the best-fit linear mixed model are: time factor, information feedback conditions and 
bidding success rate in the preceding round. The results show nonlinearity and curvature in the 
bidders’ learning curves. Their learning curves follow a decreasing trend with more competitive 
bids at the start-up learning phase before an increasing trend with less competitive bids after a 
period of time for both information feedback conditions. There is an absence of steady-state 
learning phase among the bidders, suggesting they were in a continual process of learning and yet 
to reach optimal bidding strategy. Also, all bidders are generally less competitive in time periods 
after a winning bid with lower average bids submitted by those in the full information feedback 
group. The model has captured the existence of heterogeneity across bidders with individual-
specific parameter estimates that demonstrate the uniqueness of individual bidders’ learning 
curves in recurrent bidding. The study found partial support to H1, i.e. inexperienced bidders in 
some instances become more competitive over time through learning in recurrent bidding, but 
not always. In addition, the study did not find that the learning curve of inexperienced bidders 
contained a steady-state learning phase (H2). These findings suggest that the bidders’ 
competitiveness is affected by changes in their situational conditions at the time of bidding, and 
that the variations in their bids are expected to continue for a period of time before they attain 
optimal bidding strategy via learning from their experiences. The implication to construction 
clients is that consideration needs to be given to the level of contractors’ experience and the 
changes in the market place in formulating their procurement strategies in order to obtain 
competitive bid prices.  
This study found that partial and full information feedback conditions have an impact on 
inexperienced bidders’ learning in recurrent bidding (H3) in that lower average bids were 
submitted by bidders subjected to full information feedback condition.  Given the fact that 
information feedback conditions in construction bidding vary between clients, ranging from no 
feedback to full information feedback condition, the findings advocate for adequate bidding 
feedback information in clients’ procurement design to facilitate learning among contractors, 
which may in turn lead to increased competitiveness in their bids. The findings also show that 
there is significant heterogeneity across inexperienced individual bidders’ learning in recurrent 
bidding (H4). This finding is important to practice because it indicates that individual bidders’ 
bidding behavior is dependent on many firm-specific characteristics (e.g. a firm’s relative 
efficiency in terms of management skills; the quality of its output), including some that are 
unobservable by their competitors.  
The main limitation of this study is the use of experimental dataset with student subjects in the 
modelling attempt. It is, however, recognized that experimental dataset is suitable in this context 
in exploring the specific types of learning trends among inexperienced (student) bidders under 
different information feedback conditions. This would overcome the ambiguity inherent in field 
data through active manipulation in an experimental setting, and the possible data contamination 
problem associated with experienced bidders. Future investigations may use field datasets 
consisting of both experienced and inexperienced bidders (i.e., new and existing bidders in a 
particular construction market), with the aim of establishing specific types of learning trends. 
This suggested future study can be seen as attempts to validate the present findings. Ideally, the 
field datasets should cover a reasonably long period of time in order to detect whether there is 
so-called a steady-state learning phase among bidders. As demonstrated here, the linear mixed 
Construction Economics and Building, 15(4), 16-29  
 
Oo, Ling and Soo 28 
 
modelling technique could be used to obtain the individual-specific learning trends in a relatively 
parsimonious manner. In addition, future work should consider all the three common feedback 
information conditions in construction bidding, to establish the extent to which bidders’ learning 
is affected by varying information feedback conditions, and thus to establish the ideal level of 
bidding feedback information. This may aid in improving efficiency in construction contracting 
by providing adequate bidding feedback information to contractors to facilitate their learning, 
which governs contractors’ competitiveness in recurrent bidding.  
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